Abstract.This article examines the reputation of the aquatic product logistics companies based on the signal model. We use the model to study these companies in separation equilibrium and pooling equilibrium situation and provide a static economic analysis. Suggestions are presented in the end to improve the reputation of these companies.
Introductions
In the operation process of logistics companies, the reputation problem is one of the critical factors that have an impact on their development in China. As with examples of reputation losses in our society, the reputation loss is also prevailing in logistics companies. One of the reasons is information asymmetry between logistics companies and their suppliers. The selection behaviors among those players actually become a strategy of game theory to pursue maximized benefits respectively. For example, logistics companies, who are aware of their own reputation status, tend to get larger benefits by frauds, while suppliers, without intelligence of logistics companies' reputation, are able to get the information to judge the situation only after products are delivered to destination. Thus the signal game method is a brilliant choice and will have a far-reaching influence on the information development.
Economists have long recognized the importance of trust in economic growth, judicial efficiency, government integrity, asymmetric information, and contractual enforcement. It is necessary to solve the asymmetry issue in the labor market in order to thoroughly use the labor market's information.
Analyzing effects of information asymmetry on labor market, which is the study of the reputation problems, has started from Spence since 1973 [1] . ZhangWeiYing conducted a profound discussion and gave a modeling argument to reputation theory in 1997 [2] . He also explained currently realistic reputation problems in China through reputation theory in 2001 3 . WengJunYi 4 is an early researcher from this angle since 1996. In 1999, WangXiaoLong [5] [9] argued to enhance the power of the law in order to make a path for developing the reputation. Liu BinLian and LuYan(2007) [10] papered the aspects of the logistics companies' reputation loss , and its cause and negative effects.
Wang HaiLan and WangLi (2008) [11] ,WangNing and LiuXiaoJin(2008) [12] ,LiuHongYu(2009) [13] and TaoGang(2010) [14] surveyed the present situation of logistics companies' reputation and reasons and provided resolutions in China. Data from the report of Chinese companies` repution in 2006 shows that the economic cost in the loss of companies' reputation is as high as 600 billion [15] .
To sum up, domestic researches of logistics companies' reputation problem in China emphasize on unraveling the reasons and losses, leaving scopes for using practical model to solve the problem systematically and deeply. Nevertheless there are few articles discussing reputation problems in China from the perspective of information asymmetry.
Materials and Methods
The reputation problem is practical and puzzling in the transportation process for fish, where logistics companies and fish dealers can make an oral deal. However, due to the conflict of interest, fish dealers will design a considerable complicate contract to ensure their own interests, logistics companies will make a deviation to the fish dealers for their own interests. It is very difficult that for fish dealers to select a high reputation logistics companies. The paper tries to deal with the problem using the theory of complete information dynamic game model.
Assumptions
The transaction time sequence between fish dealers and logistics companies is as follows:
(1)Assume the reputation level of logistics companies' isӨ,which may be high(H) or low(L). Let P be the probability of "Ө = H" .
(2)Logistics companies realizes its reputation level and subsequently estimates a rough fresh fish rate as e (e≥0,e∈E). For the logistics company, the average income is positively correlated to the proportion of fresh fish in transportation, which is a widely accepted fact that makes e a preferred variable.
Model contents
The model describes a signal game with two participants. One is fish dealers from the competitive market. The other one is a logistics company which sends the signal of the fresh fish rate level, e(e≥0,e ∈E). Assuming logistics companies are categorized into high（H） and low（L）according to their reputation level. The H company's prior probability is set for P.. . One basic assumption is that if a low reputation logistics company wants to get the same fresh fish rate, it has to cost more compared with a high reputation company. "e"s are
When it is incomplete information, if the fish dealers observe the signals for e and then get a posteriori probability of H company for
.Assuming the risk for fish dealers is neutral, then we can get a expectation output of the logistics company as follows:
(1)
Due to competition, fish dealers would take the [4] step.
As a signal game, this model is discussed in two scenarios, namely separation equilibrium and pooling balanced equilibrium in certain conditions.
In separation equilibrium, low reputation companies can't imitate high reputation ones because the cost of high survival rate is not enough to compensate their own costs. Therefore we get:
See fig. 1 
Fig. 1. Separation equilibrium condition
But in pooling equilibrium, low reputation companies can imitate high survival rate and therefore get larger benefits to compensate their own costs. 
Pooling equilibrium
The assumption in pooling equilibrium is that both two types of logistics companies choose the same reputation level p e , then fish dealers observe the p e and get
( P is the prior probability of the H companies). According to the assumption, fish dealers' optimal wage rate is:
In the disequilibrium path, here we get:
According to (2), the optimal choice for fish dealers is:
Given fish dealer's given reaction, logistics companies that have a reputation of  will be forced to choose a e by the following condition:
The equation（8）is really simple, logistics companies with reputation of  choose a to the perfect bayesian pooling equilibrium of the game.
Fig. 3. pooling equilibrium
Even for the indifference curves and the amount of products in fig. 3 , there are also many other perfect poolings, some of which are chosen the different fresh fish rate and of other which are in the different disequilibrium signals.
Obviously, in fig. 3 , as long as the fresh fish rate is between * e and ' e , it is easy to constitute more infinite pooling equilibriums.
It can be inferred that we can also get other pooling equilibriums by solely changing the path of information disequilibrium.
Exchange the (6) to : 
Separation equilibrium
Additionally, we investigate the separation equilibrium situation, see figure 1 . Obviously, the most natural of separation of logistics company strategy equilibrium is for
After the signal, fish dealers get a posteriori probability for:
According to （2） we get a result as follows :
Under the disequilibrium condition, the provisions are as follows: 
The optimal choice for fish dealers are: If we assume geometric relations in figure 2 instead of in figure. 1, we study the separation equilibrium. At this point, due to the tendency of being imitated, high reputation logistics companies need to take actions to resist it and require higher costs to obtain a higher fresh rate, thus making it difficult for imitation to continue. At last it appears a separation equilibrium. Fish dealers, who observe the costs of the high fresh fish rate, also consider these companies as high reputation ones and then offer them a higher wage rate as a reward.
Thus, we know that the high reputation logistics companies need to choose ) ( * H e e s  to constitute separation equilibrium. See fig.4 . 
The optimal choice of fish dealers is 
Conclusions and Discussion
Based on current achievements in economics and realistic information asymmetry problems, the article discusses the reputation theory between the fish dealers and the logistics companies in aquatic logistics supply chain, and analyzes the reputation relations between them using Spence's models from the perspective of game theory.
Several measures can be taken to establish more stable relations with fish dealers and enhance the development of modern logistics industry, for instance:
(1)Offer a price high enough to high reputation logistics companies in order to make them feel worthwhile to keep their reputation, and to ensure that long-term revenues are not less than short-term income .
(2)For low reputation logistics companies, effective regulations and punishment mechanism should be founded. Once frauds are found in such companies, fish dealers can fire them and discard them afterwards (3) Use the "collectivism" punishment mechanism. If a logistics company's reputation is low, all dealers in one transaction region will participate in this mechanism and ensure that any company in blacklist will never be hired again. (4) For the companies in the pooling equilibrium situation, namely low reputation ones that imitate high ones, government should on one hand establish stricter laws for prevention and punishment, and on the other hand launch favorable policies to promote the logistics industry. Try to turn the pooling equilibrium into the separation equilibrium, thus eliminating low reputation companies or helping them convert to high reputation companies.
Applications of strict measures to control dynamic information and to monitor the logistics companies' reputation can to some extent lead logistics industry to a better stage. However in face of many different equilibriums, it is crucial to understand why certain equilibrium is eventually chosen and its subsequent development. This article does not explore how to gradually squeeze out low reputation companies from the industry, or change into the high reputation companies, which, hopefully, I will be able to supplement in later researches.
